The direct effect of one event on another can be defined and measured by holding constant all intermediate variables between the two. Indirect effects present conceptual and prac tical difficulties (in nonlinear models), be cause they cannot be isolated by holding cer tain variables constant. This paper presents a new way of defining the effect transmit ted through a restricted set of paths, without controlling variables on the remaining paths. This permits the assessment of a more nat ural type of direct and indirect effects, one that is applicable in both linear and nonlinear models and that has broader policy-related interpretations. The paper establishes con ditions under which such assessments can be estimated consistently from experimen tal and nonexperimental data, and thus ex tends path-analytic techniques to nonlinear and nonparametric models.
INTRODUCTION
The distinction between total, direct, and indirect ef fects is deeply entrenched in causal conversations, and attains practical importance in many applications, in cluding policy decisions, legal definitions and health care analysis. Structural equation modeling (SEM) (Goldberger 1972) , which provides a methodology of defining and estimating such effects, has been re stricted to linear analysis, and no comparable method ology has been devised to extend these capabilities to models involving nonlinear dependencies,1 as those 1 A notable exception is the counterfactual analysis of Robins and Greenland (1992) which is applicable to non linear models, but does not incorporate path-analytic tech niques.
commonly used in AI applications (Hagenaars 1993, p. 17 ).
The causal relationship that is easiest to interpret, define and estimate is the total effect. Written as P(Y"' = y), the total effect measures the probability that response variable Y would take on the value y when X is set to x by external intervention.2 This probability function is what we normally assess in a controlled experiment in which X is randomized and in which the distribution of Y is estimated for each level x of X.
In many cases, however, this quantity does not ade quately represent the target of investigation and at tention is focused instead on the direct effect of X on Y. The term "direct effect" is meant to quantify an influence that is not mediated by other variables in the model or, more accurately, the sensitivity of Y to changes in X while all other factors in the analysis are held fixed. Naturally, holding those factors fixed would sever all causal paths from X to Y with the exception of the direct link X ---t Y, which is not intercepted by any intermediaries.
Indirect effects cannot be define in this manner, be cause it is impossible to hold a set of variables con stant in such a way that the effect of X on Y mea sured under those conditions would circumvent the di rect pathway, if such exists. Thus, the definition of indirect effects has remained incomplete, and, save for asserting inequality between direct and total effects, the very concept of "indirect effect" was deemed void of operational meaning (Pearl 2000, p. 165 ).
This paper shows that it is possible to give an op erational meaning to both direct and indirect effects 2The substripted notation Y, is borrowed from the potential-outcome framework of Rubin (1974) . Pearl (2000) used, interchangeably, P, (y), P(yido(x)), P(yix), and P(yx), and showed their equivalence to probabilities of subjunctive conditionals: P((X = x) 0--t (Y = y)) (Lewis 1973) .
without fixing variables in the model, thus extending the applicability of these concepts to nonlinear and nonparametric models. The proposed generalization is based on a more subtle interpretation of "effects" , here called "descriptive" (see Section 2.2), which con cerns the action of causal forces under natural, rather than experimental conditions, and provides answers to a broader class of policy-related questions. This inter pretation yields the standard path-coefficients in linear models, but leads to different formal definitions and different estimation procedures of direct and indirect effects in nonlinear models.
Following a conceptual discussion of the descriptive and prescriptive interpretations (Section 2.2) , Section 2.3 illustrates their distinct roles in decision-making contexts, while Section 2.4 discusses the descriptive basis and policy implications of indirect effects. Sec tions 3.2 and 3.3 provide, respectively, mathematical formulation of the prescriptive and descriptive inter pretations of direct effects, while Section 3.4 estab lishes conditions under which the descriptive (or "nat ural") interpretation can be estimated consistently from either experimental or nonexperimental data. Sections 3.5 and 3.6 extend the fo rmulation and iden tification analysis to indirect effects. In Section 3. 7, we generalize the notion of indirect effect to path-specific effects, that is, effects transmitted through any speci fied set of paths in the model.
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CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
Direct versus Total Effects
A classical example of the ubiquity of direct effects (Hesslow 1976 ) tells the story of a birth-control pill that is suspect of producing thrombosis in women and, at the same time, has a negative indirect effect on thrombosis by reducing the rate of pregnancies (preg nancy is known to encourage thrombosis). In this ex ample, interest is fo cused on the direct effect of the pill because it represents a stable biological relation ship that, unlike the total effect, is invariant to mar ital status and other factors that may affect women's chances of getting pregnant or of sustaining pregnancy. This invariance makes the direct effect transportable across cultural and sociological boundaries and, hence, a more useful quantity in scientific explanation and policy analysis.
Another class of examples involves legal disputes over race or sex discrimination in hiring. Here, neither the effect of sex or race on applicants' qualification nor the effect of qualification on hiring are targets of lit igation. Rather, defendants must prove that sex and race do not directly influence hiring decisions, whatever indirect effects they might have on hiring by way of applicant qualification. This is made quite explicit in the following court ruling:
"The central question in any employment discrimination case is whether the employer would have taken the same action had the employee been of a different race (age, sex, religion, national origin etc.) and everything else had been the same." (Carson versus Bethlehem Steel Corp., 70 FEP Cases 921, 7th Cir. (1996) , Quoted in Gastwirth 1997.) Taking this criterion as a guideline, the direct effect of X on Y (in our case X =gender Y =hiring) can roughly be defined as the response of Y to change in X (say from X = x • to X = x) while keeping all other accessible variables at their initial value, namely, the value they would have attained under X = x
• .3
This doubly-hypothetical criterion will be given pre cise mathematical formulation in Section 3, using the language and semantics of structural counterfactuals (Pearl 2000 ; chapter 7).
As a third example, one that illustrates the policy making ramifications of direct and total effects, con sider a drug treatment that has a side effectheadache. Patients who suffer from headache tend to take aspirin which, in turn may have its own effect on the disease or, may strengthen (or weaken) the impact of the drug on the disease. To determine how bene ficial the drug is to the population as a whole, under existing patterns of aspirin usage, the total effect of the drug is the target of analysis, and the difference P(Yx = y) -P(Yx• = y ) may serve to assist the de cision, with x and x• being any two treatment levels. However, to decide whether aspirin should be encour aged or discouraged during the treatment, the direct effect of the drug on the disease, both with aspirin and without aspirin, should be the target of investigation. The appropriate expression for analysis would then be the difference P(Yxz = y ) -P(Yx•z = y), where z stands for any specified level of aspirin intake.
In linear systems, direct effects are fu lly specified by the corresponding path coefficients, and are indepen dent of the values at which we hold the the interme diate variables (Z in our examples). In nonlinear sys tems, those values would, in general, modify the effect of X on Y and thus should be chosen carefully to rep resent the target policy under analysis. This lead to a basic distinction between two types of conceptualiza tions: prescriptive and descriptive.
Descriptive versus prescriptive interpretation
We will illustrate this distinction using the treatment aspirin example described in the last section. In the prescriptive conceptualization, we ask whether a spe cific untreated patient would improve if treated, while holding the aspirin intake fixed at some predetermined level, say Z = z. In the descriptive conceptualization, we ask again whether the untreated patient would im prove if treated, but now we hold the aspirin intake fixed at whatever level the patient currently consumes under no-treatment condition. The difference between these two conceptualizations lies in whether we wish to account for the natural relationship between the direct and the mediating cause (that is, between treatment and aspirin) or to modify that relationship to match policy objectives. We call the effect computed from the descriptive perspective the natural effect, and the one computed from the prescriptive perspective the controlled effect.
Consider a patient who takes aspirin if and only if treated, and for whom the treatment is effective only when aspirin is present. For such a person, the treat ment is deemed to have no natural direct effect (on recovery), because, by keeping the aspirin at the cur rent, pre-treatment level of zero, we ensure that the treatment effect would be nullified. The controlled di rect effect, however, is nonzero for this person, because the efficacy of the treatment would surface when we fix the aspirin intake at non-zero level. Note that the descriptive formulation requires knowledge of the in dividual natural behavior�in our example, whether the untreated patient actually uses aspirin-while the prescriptive formulation requires no such knowledge.
This difference becomes a major stumbling block when it comes to estimating average direct effects in a pop ulation of individuals. At the population level, the prescriptive formulation is pragmatic; we wish to pre dict the difference in recovery rates between treated and untreated patients when a prescribed dose of as pirin is administered to all patients in the population the actual consumption of aspirin under uncontrolled conditions need not concern us. In contrast, the de scriptive formulation is attributional; we ask whether an observed improvement in recovery rates (again, be tween treated and untreated patients) is attributable to the treatment itself, as opposed to preferential use of aspirin among treated patients. To properly distin guish between these two contributions, we therefore need to measure the improvement in recovery rates while making each patient take the same level of as pirin that he/she took before treatment. However, as Robins and Greenland (1992) pointed out, such con trol over individual behavior would require testing the same group of patients twice (i.e., under treatment and no treatment conditions), and cannot be administered in experiments with two different groups, however ran domized. (There is no way to determine what level of aspirin an untreated patient would take if treated, unless we actually treat that patient and, then, this patient could no longer be eligible for the untreated group.) Since repeatable tests on the same individu als are rarely feasible, the descriptive measure of the direct effect is not generally estimable fr om standard experimental studies. In Section 3.4 we will analyze what additional assumptions are required for consis tently estimating this measure, the average natural di rect effect, from either experimental or observational studies.
Policy implications of the Descriptive interpretation
Why would anyone be interested in assessing the aver age natural direct effect? Assume that the drug manu facturer is considering ways of eliminating the adverse side-effect of the drug, in our case, the headache. A natural question to ask is whether the drug would still retain its effectiveness in the population of interest. The controlled direct effect would not give us the an swer to this question, because it refers to a specifi c aspirin level, taken uniformly by all individuals. Our target population is one where aspirin intake varies from individual to individual, depending on other fac tors beside drug-induced headache, factors which may also cause the effectiveness of the drug to vary from individual to individual. Therefore, the parameter we need to assess is the average natural direct effect, as described in the Subsection 2.2.
This example demonstrates that the descriptive inter pretation of direct effects is not purely "descriptive"; it carries a definite operational implications, and an swers policy-related questions of practical significance. Moreover, note that the policy question considered in this example cannot be represented in the standard syntax of do(x) operators�it does not involve fixing any of the variables in the model but, rather, modify ing the causal paths in the model. Even if "headache" were a genuine variable in our model, the elimination of any drug-induced headache is not equivalent to set ting any "headache" to zero, since a person might get headache for reason other than the drug. Instead, the policy option involves the de-activation of the causal path from "drug" to "headache" .
In general, the average natural direct effect would be of interest in evaluating policy options of a more re fined variety, ones that involve, not merely fixing the levels of the variables in the model, but also deter mining how these levels would influence one another.
Typical examples of such options involve choosing the manner (e.g., instrument, or timing) in which a given decision is implemented, or choosing the agents that should be informed about the decision. A firm of ten needs to assess, for example, whether it would be worthwhile to conceal a certain decision from a competitor. This amounts, again, to evaluating the natural direct effect of the decision in question, un mediated by the competitor's reaction. Theoretically, such policy options could conceivably be represented as (values of) variables in a more refined model, for example one where the concept "the effect of treat ment on headache" would be given a variable name, and where the manufacturer decision to eliminate side effects would be represented by fixing this hypothetical variable to zero. The analysis of this paper shows that such unnatural modeling techniques can be avoided, and that important nonstandard policy questions can be handled by standard models, where variables stands for directly measurable quantities.
Descriptive interpretation of indirect effects
The descriptive conception of direct effects can eas ily be transported to the formulation of indirect ef fects; oddly, the prescriptive formulation is not trans portable. Returning to our treatment-aspirin exam ple, if we wish to assess the natural indirect effect of treatment on recovery for a specific patient, we with hold treatment and ask, instead, whether that patient would recover if given as much aspirin as he/she would have taken if he/she had been under treatment. In this way, we insure that whatever changes occur in the pa tient's condition are due to treatment-induced aspirin consumption and not to the treatment itself. Similarly, at the population level, the natural indirect effect of the treatment is interpreted as the improvement in re covery rates if we were to withhold treatment from all patients but, instead, let each patient take the same level of aspirin that he/she would have taken under treatment. As in the descriptive formulation of di rect effects, this hypothetical quantity involves nested counterfactuals and will be identifiable only under spe cial circumstances.
The prescriptive formulation has no parallel in indi rect effects, for reasons discussed in the introduction section; there is no way of preventing the direct effect from operating by holding certain variables constant.
We will see that, in linear systems, the descriptive and prescriptive formulations of direct effects lead, indeed, to the same expression in terms of path coefficients. The corresponding linear expression for indirect ef fects, computed as the difference between the total and direct effects, coincides with the descriptive formulation but finds no prescriptive interpretation.
The operational implications of indirect effects, like those of natural direct effect, concern nonstandard pol icy options. Although it is impossible, by controlling variables, to block a direct path (i.e., a single edge), if such exists, it is nevertheless possible to block such a path by more refined policy options, ones that de activate the direct path through the manner in which an action is taken or through the mode by which a variable level is achieved. In the hiring discrimination example, if we make it illegal to question applicants about their gender, (and if no other indication of gen der are available to the hiring agent), then any residual sex preferences (in hiring) would be attributable to the indirect effect of sex on hiring. A policy maker might well be interested in predicting the magnitude of such preferences fr om data obtained prior to implementing the no-questioning policy, and the average indirect ef fect would then provide the sought for prediction. A similar refinement applies in the firm-competitor ex ample of the preceding subsection. A firm might wish to assess, for example, the economical impact of bluff ing a competitor into believing that a certain deci sion has been taken by the firm, and this could be implemented by (secretly) instructing certain agents to ignore the decision. In both cases, our model may not be sufficiently detailed to represents such policy options in the form of variable fixing (e.g., the agents may not be represented as intermediate nodes between the decision and its effect) and the task amounts then to evaluating the average natural indirect effects in a coarse-grain model, where a direct link exists between the decision and its outcome.
FORMAL ANALYSIS
Notation
Throughout our analysis we will let X be the control variable (whose effect we seek to assess), and let Y be the response variable. We will let Z stand for the set of all intermediate variables between X and Y which, in the simplest case considered, would be a single variable as in Figure 1 (a) . Most of our results will still be valid if we let Z stand for any set of such variables, in particular, the set of Y's parents excluding X.
We will use the counterfactual notation Yx (u) to de note the value that Y would attain in unit (or situa tion) U = u under the control regime do(X = x). See Pearl (2000, Chapter 7) for formal semantics of these counterfactual utterances. Many concepts associated with direct and indirect effect require comparison to a reference value of X, that is, a value relative to which we measure changes. We will designate this reference value by x*.
3.2
Controlled Direct Effects (review) In words, the value of Y under X = x* differs from its value under X = x when we keep all other variables Z fixed at z. If condition ( 1) is satisfied for some z, we say that the transition event X = x has a controlled direct-effect on Y, keeping the reference point X = x* implicit. Clearly, confining Z to the parents of Y (excluding X)
leaves the definition unaltered.
Definition 2 (Controlled unit-level direct-effect; quantitative) Given a causal model M with causal graph G, the controlled direct effect of X = x on Y in unit U = u and setting Z = z is given by
where Z stands for all parents of Y (in G) excluding X.
Alternatively, the ratio Yxz(u)/Yx•z(u), the propor tional difference (Yxz(u)-Yx•z(u))/Yx•z(u), or some other suitable relationship might be used to quantify the magnitude of the direct effect; the difference is by far the most common measure, and will be used throughout this paper.
Definition 3 (Average controlled direct effect) Given a probabilistic causal model (M, P(u)), the con trolled direct effect of event X = x on Y is defined as:
where the expectation is taken over u.
The distribution P(Yxz = y) can be estimated consis tently from experimental studies in which both X and Z are randomized. In nonexperimental studies, the identification of this distribution requires that certain "no-confounding" assumptions hold true in the pop ulation tested. Graphical criteria encapsulating these assumptions are described in Pearl (2 000, Sections 4.3 and 4.4). In words, the value of Y under X = x* differs from its value under X = x even when we keep Z at the same value ( Zx· ( u ) ) that Z attains under X = x*.
We can easily extend this definition from events to variables by defining X as having a natural direct effect on Y (in model M and situation U = u ) if there exist two values, x* and x, that satisfy ( 4). Note that this definition no longer requires that we specify a value z for Z; that value is determined naturally by the model, once we specify x, x*, and u. Note also that condition ( 4) is a direct literal translation of the court criterion of sex discrimination in hiring (Section 2.1) with X = x* being a male, X =: x a female, Y = 1 a decision to hire, and Z the set of all other attributes of individual u.
If one is interested in the magnitude of the natural direct effect, one can take the difference
and designate it by the symbol N DE(x, x*; Y, u) (acronym for Natural Direct Effect). If we are further interested in assessing the average of this difference in a population of units, we have:
The average natural direct effect of event X = x on a response variable Y, denoted N DE(x, x*; Y), is de fined as
Applied to the sex discrimination example of Section 2.1, (with x* = male, x = female, y = hiring, z = qualifications) Eq. (6) measures the expected change in male hiring, E(Y,. ), if employers were instructed to treat males' applications as though they were females'.
Natural Direct Effects: Identification
As noted in Section 2, we cannot generally evaluate the average natural direct-effect from empirical data. Formally, this means that Eq. (6) is not reducible to expressions of the form
the former governs the causal effect of X on Y ( ob tained by randomizing X) and the latter governs the causal effect of X and Z on Y (obtained by random izing both X and Z) .
We now present conditions under which such reduction is nevertheless feasible. (read: Yxz is conditionally independent of Zx·, given W), then the average natural direct-effect is experi mentally identifiable, and it is given by
The first term in (6) can be written
Using (7), we obtain:
Each factor in (10) is identifiable; E(Yxz = y]W = w), by randomizing X and Z for each value of W, and P(Zx• = ziW = w) by randomizing X for each value of W. This proves the assertion in the theorem. Sub stituting (10) into (6) and using the law of composition E(Yx•) = E(Yx• z • • ) (Pearl2000, p. 22 9) gives (8), and completes the proof of Theorem 1.
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The conditional independence relation in Eq. (7) can easily be verified from the causal graph associated with the model. Using a graphical interpretation of coun terfactuals (Pearl 2000, p. 214-5) , this relation reads:
In words, W d-separates Y from Z in the graph formed by deleting all (solid) arrows emanating from X and z. (11) is somewhat stronger than (7), since the former implies the latter for every pair of values, x and x*, of X (see (Pearl 2000, p. 214) ). Likewise, condition (7) can be relaxed in several ways. However, since assumptions of counterfactual independencies can be meaningfully substantiated only when cast in struc tural form (Pearl2000, p. 244-5), graphical conditions will be the target of our analysis. The identification of the natural direct effect from non experimental data requires stronger conditions. From
Eq. (8) we see that it is sufficient to identify the con ditional probabilities of two counterfactuals: P(Y xz = y]W = w) and P(Zx· = z]W = w), where W is any set of covariates that satisfies Eq. (7) (or (11)). This yields the following criterion for identification:
is identifiable in nonexperimental studies if there exists a set W of covariates, nondescendants of X or Z, such that, for all values z and x we have:
Moreover, if conditions ( i) -(iii) are satisfied, the nat ural direct effect is given by ( 8).
Explicating these identification conditions in graphical terms (using Theorem 4.41 in (Pearl 2000) ) yields the following corollary:
Corollary 1 (Graphical identification criterion) The average natural direct-effect N DE(x, x*; Y) is identifiable in nonexperimental studies if there exist four sets of covariates, W0, W1, W2, and W3, such that
, and W3 contain no descendant of X and w2 contains no descendant of z.
(Remark: G x_z denotes the graph formed by deleting
(from G) all arrows emanating from X or entering Z.)
As an example for applying these criteria, consider Fig  ure 1(a) , and assume that all variables (including the U's) are observable. Conditions (i)-(iv) of Corollary 1 are satisfied if we choose:
or, alternatively, It is instructive to examine the form that expression (8) takes in Markovian models, (that is, acyclic models with independent error terms) where condition (7) is always satisfied with W = 0, since Yxz is independent of all variables in the model. In Markovian models, we also have the following three relationships:
since X U Z is the set of Y's parents, P(Zx• = z) = L P(zlx*, s)P(s),
where S stands for the parents of Z, excluding X, or any other set satisfying the back-door criterion (Pearl 2000, p. 79) . This yields the following corollary of Theorem 1:
Corollary 2 The average natural direct effect in Markovian models is identifiable from nonexperimental data, and it is given by
where S stands for any set satisfying the back-door cri terion between X and Z.
Eq. (15) follows by substituting (14) into (6) Further insight can be gained by examining simple Markovian models in which the effect of X on Z is not confounded, that is,
In such models, a simple version of which is illustrated in Fig. 2(b 
This expression has a simple interpretation as a weighted average of the controlled direct effect E(Yix, z)-E(Yix*, z), where the intermediate value z is chosen according to its distribution under x*.
3.5 Natural Indirect Effects: Formulation
As we discussed in Section 2.4, the prescriptive for mulation of "controlled direct effect" has no parallel in indirect effects; we therefore use the descriptive for mulation, and define natural indirect effects at both the unit and population levels. Lacking the controlled alternative, we will drop the title "natural" from dis cussions of indirect effects, unless it serves to convey a contrast. X=x.
Taking the difference between the two sides of Eq. (18) 
and proceed to define its average in the population:
The average indirect effect of event X = x. on variable Y, denoted NIE(x,x*; Y), is defined as
Comparing Eqs. (6) and {20), we see that the indirect effect associated with the transition from x* to x is closely related to the natural direct effect associated with the reverse transition, from x to x*. In fact, re calling that the difference E(Y,) -E(Y,.) equals the total effect of X = x on Y,
we obtain the following theorem: In words, the total effect (on Y) associated with the transition from x* to x is equal to the difference be tween the indirect effect associated with this transition and the ( naturaQ direct effect associated with the re verse transition, from x to x*.
As strange as these relationships appear, they produce the standard, additive relation
when applied to linear models. The reason is clear; in linear systems the effect of the transition from x* to x is proportional to x -x*, hence it is always equal and of opposite sign to the effect of the reverse transition.
Thus, substituting in (22) (or (23)), yields (24).
3.6 Natural Indirect Effects: Identification
Eqs. (22) and (23) show that the indirect effect is iden tified whenever both the total and the (natural) direct effect are identified (for all x and x*). Moreover, the identification conditions and the resulting expressions for indirect effects are identical to the corresponding ones for direct effects (Theorems I and 2), save for a simple exchange of the indices x and x*. This is explicated in the following theorem. for all x and z, then the average indirect-effect is ex perimentally identifiable, and it is given by
Moreover, the average indirect effect is identified in nonexperimental studies whenever the following ex pressions are identified for all z and w:
E(Yx·z /w), P(Z, = ziw) and P(Z,. = ziw),
with W satisfying Eq. {25).
In the simple Markovian model depicted in Fig. 2(b 
Contrasting Eq. (27) with Eq. (I 7), we see that the ex pression for the indirect effect fixes X at the reference value x•, and lets z vary according to its distribution under the post-transition value of X = x. The ex pression for the direct effect fixes X at x, and lets z vary according to its distribution under the reference conditions X = x•.
Applied to the sex discrimination example of Section 2.1, Eq. (27) measures the expected change in male
hiring, E(Y,. ), if males were trained to acquire (in distribution) equal qualifications (Z = z) as those of females (X= x).
7 General Path-specific Effects
The analysis of the last section suggests that path specific effects can best be understood in terms of a path-deactivation process, where a selected set of paths, rather than nodes, are forced to remain inactive during the transition from X= x• to X= x. In Figure 3, where P A;(g) represents those members of P A; that are linked to X; in g, and P A;(g) represents the com plementary set, from whi ch there is no link to X; in g. We replace each function j ;( pa;, u) with a new func tion f t (pa;, u; g), defined as ft(pa;, u; g) = f;( p ai( g) , p a: ( g ), u)
where pa i (g) stands for the values that the variables in P A; ( g ) would attain (in M and u) under X = x* (that is, pa i (g) = P A; (g) 
We demonstrate this construction in the model of 
It can be shown that the identification conditions for general path-specific effects are much more stringent than those of the direct and indirect effects. The path specific effect shown in Figure 3 , for example, is not identified even in Markovian models. Since direct and indirect effects are special cases of path-specific effects, the identification conditions of Theorems 2 and 3 raise the interesting question of whether a simple character ization exists of the class of subgraphs, g, whose path specific effects are identifiable in Markovian models. I hope inquisitive readers will be able to solve this open problem.
Conclusions
This paper formulates a new definition of path-specific effects that is based on path switching, instead of vari able fixing, and that extends the interpretation and evaluation of direct and indirect effects to nonlinear models. It is shown that, in nonparametric models, direct and indirect effects can be estimated consis tently from both experimental and nonexperimental data, provided certain conditions hold in the causal diagram. Markovian models always satisfy these con ditions. Using the new definition, the paper provides an operational interpretation of indirect effects, the policy significance of which was deemed enigmatic in recent literature.
On the conceptual front, the paper uncovers a class of nonstandard policy questions that cannot be for-mulated in the usual variable-fixing vocabulary and that can be evaluated, nevertheless, using the notions of direct and indirect effects. These policy questions concern redirecting the flow of influence in the system, and generally involve the deactivation of existing in fluences among specific variables. The ubiquity and manageabiligy of such questions in causal modeling suggest that value-assignment manipulations, which control the outputs of the causal mechanism in the model, are less fundamental to the notion of causation than input-selection manipulations, which control the signals driving those mechanisms.
